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 The Impact of “Anti-Sharia” Legislation on 
Arbitration and Why Judge Nielsen in Florida Got It 
Right 
Katherine A. Sanoja* 
INTRODUCTION 
Several cases in the past few years,1 in addition to growing anti-
Muslim sentiment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, have sparked a 
wave of debates over the role of foreign and international law in many 
of the states’ legislatures.2  In an effort to ban the application of Sharia 
law, almost half of the states have proposed legislation containing 
blanket prohibitions against the application of foreign or international 
law by state courts.3  Although most of the bills and proposed constitu-
tional amendments have died in committees or have failed adoption,4 
the impulsive reaction of legislatures to draft this type of legislation 
demonstrates a distrust and misunderstanding about the relationship 
between domestic law and international and foreign law.5  
Beginning in 2010, legislators across the United States proposed 
bills and/or constitutional amendments limiting the application and 
                                                                                                                           
 *  J.D., Florida International University College of Law, 2012.  
  1 See, e.g., Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011); 
S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (reversing lower court’s decision deny-
ing a wife’s request for a restraining order against her husband and rejecting lower court’s find-
ing that husband’s religious views caused him to lack criminal intent); Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 
N.W.2d 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App. 2003).  
 2 Elizabeth Flock, Sharia Law Ban: Is Oklahoma’s Proposed Ban Discriminatory or 
Needed?, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
blogpost/post/sharia-law-ban-is-oklahomas-proposal-discriminatory-or-useful/2012/01/11/gIQAGFP 
1qP_blog.html. 
 3 Robert P. Jones, The State of Anti-Sharia Bills, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 3:55 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/figuring-faith/post/the-state-of-”anti-sharia”-bills/2012/02/ 
29/gIQAql5miR_blog.html. 
 4 Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Law in Arizona, Bills Ad-
vance in Missouri and Texas, Failing in Most States, GAVEL TO GAVEL (May 3, 2011), http:// 
gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/05/03/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-law-in-arizona-bills 
-advance-in-missouri-and-texas-failing-in-most-states. 
 5 See, e.g., Flock, supra note 2; William R. Levesque, Judge Explains Use of  Islamic Law, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, at 1B. 
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use of foreign and international law.6  Although so far only four states 
adopted the proposed legislation,7 many of the bills that were intro-
duced in 2011 made a comeback in the 2012 legislative session.8  
Thirty-three bills in total are being considered, fifteen of which were 
carried over from the 2011 legislative session.9  The most recent states 
to propose bills in this area are Georgia, Mississippi, Kentucky, New 
Jersey, and Virginia.10  
The move to propose bans or limitations on the use of interna-
tional or foreign law has significant constitutional implications under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and has the potential to un-
dermine commercial and social intercourse through private arbitra-
tion.  Part I briefly touches on the political and social contours that 
prompted legislatures to consider this issue.  Part II offers a historical 
reflection on arbitration and the choice-of-law clause, and the limita-
tions on the recognition of party autonomy and choice-of-law provi-
sions under the principle of “freedom to contract.”  Part III provides 
an analysis of relevant case law on the recognition of choice of foreign 
law clauses and the application of international law in domestic cases.  
Finally, Part IV is a critical analysis of legislation that has been en-
acted into law, and the impact such legislation will have on arbitration 
and international business transactions.   
I. BACKGROUND 
In Florida, Circuit Court Judge Richard A. Nielsen was severely 
criticized by conservatives and the media after his decision to uphold 
the application of Sharia law to a dispute between parties involved 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State Legislatures, 
INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110526.cfm (22 states proposed legislation 
by 2011). 
 7 H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effective 
Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22); H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 
2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend., amending art. 7, §1); H.B. 785, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 
2010) (approved June 29, 2010; effective Aug. 15, 2010) (codified at 2011 La. R.S. 9:6000); H.B. 
3768, 106th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.  (Tenn. 2010 ) (approved May, 27, 2010) (codified at 2010 
Tenn. Pub. Act. 983). 
 8 Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: 33 Bills in 20 States to Start 
2012; Review of All Efforts since 2010, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/01/30/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-33-bills-in-20-
states-to-start-2012-review-of-all-efforts-since-2010. 
 9 Id. 
 10 H.B. 631, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012) (introduced Jan. 11 2012); A919, 215th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.J. 2012) (Pre-filed on Jan. 10, 2012); H.B. 698, 106th Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 
2012); 2012 Reg. Sess. H.B. 386 (Ky. 2012); S.R. 926, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012) (Const. 
Amend.).  
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with the Islamic Education Center in Tampa.11  Both parties had ini-
tially agreed to the application of Sharia law to their dispute in arbi-
tration.12  However, after the arbitration, the losing party sought to 
invalidate the award in state court on the basis that the application of 
Sharia law was unconstitutional and that Florida law should decide 
the dispute.13  The judge ruled that the two parties were bound by the 
rules they set forth in their own arbitration agreement and that the 
court’s only role was to ensure that the rules agreed upon, in this case 
based on Sharia, were followed.14  Even though the judge affirmed the 
application of Sharia law, he applied Sharia only because the princi-
ples of United States’ contract law dictated that result.15 
This Florida case is the type of case cited by “anti-Sharia” legisla-
tion proponents as an example of the intrusion of Sharia into our legal 
system.16  David Yerulshami, general counsel for the Center for Secu-
rity Policy, a Washington-based research institute, has been at the fore-
front of the anti-Sharia movement.17  Much of the proposed legislation 
has been modeled after “anti-Sharia” legislation drafted by Mr. 
Yerulshami himself.18  
                                                                                                                           
 11 Levesque, supra note 5; see also Should Rulings Under Any Law but US Law Be Al-
lowed?, RUSH LIMBAUGH REPORT (Mar. 24, 2011), http://rushlimbaughreport. 
blogspot.com/2011/03/should-rulings-under-any-law-but-us-law.html.  
 12 Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr., No. 08-CA-3497, at *3 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011). 
 13 See id. at *2. 
 14 Id. at *4; see also William R. Levesque, Appeals Court Will Not Stop Hillsborough Judge 
from Considering Islamic Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www. 
tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/appeals-court-wont-stop-hillsborough-judge-from-considering-
islamic-law/1198321 (appellate court denied a petition filed by the Islamic Education Center 
challenging Judge Nielsen’s decision).  
 15 Mansour, No. 08-CA-3497, at * 4 (judge ruled based on neutral principles of contract law 
which grant deference to the parties’ choice of law as long as it does not violate public policy). 
 16 CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF APPELLATE COURT CASES 11, 165-69 (May 20, 2011), available at 
http://shariahinamericancourts.com. 
 17 Andrea Elliott, Behind an Anti-Shariah Push, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2011, at A1; see also 
Dispelling the Sharia Threat Myth: Implications of Banning Courts from Referencing Religious, 
Foreign or International Law [hereinafter Dispelling Sharia Threat],Webinar held by the Ameri-
can Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the ABA Center for 
Continuing Legal Education (Dec 7, 2011) (CD-ROM on file at Florida International University 
Library); Pamela Geller, Oklahoma’s Amendment Banning Shariah, ATLAS SHRUGS (Nov. 29, 
2010), http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2010/11/oklahoma-amendment-banning-
shariah.html. 
 18 Elliott, supra note 17; see also Matt Sedensky, Florida Foreign Law Ban: Measure Ban-
ning Shariah, Other Foreign Law Progresses in Statehouse, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/florida-foreign-law-ban-shariah_n_1315873.html. 
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Although most of the laws proposed contain blanket provisions 
banning the application of foreign or international law,19 the real impe-
tus behind this type of legislation is an increasing fear that Sharia law 
will enter the United States’ judicial system.20  One need only take a 
look at the language of Tennessee’s 2011 proposed House Bill No. 
1353 and Senate Bill No. 1028 to understand the political “reality” that 
is fueling this type of legislations.21  Politicians have capitalized on in-
creasing anti-Muslim sentiment22 and the proposal of anti-Sharia law 
provisions as an opportunity to reinforce a concern for United States’ 
sovereignty and national security.23  The media and politicians have 
grasped onto the country’s anti-Muslim sentiment, exaggerating and 
misconstruing the reality and place of Sharia in the United States.24  
Illustrating the political xenophobia fueling the proposal of anti-
Sharia legislation, Oklahoma State Representative Rex Duncan 
stated, “understand that this is a war for the survival of America.  It's a 
cultural war, it's a social war, it’s a war for the survival of our coun-
try.”25   
In order to avoid constitutional issues, states proposing this type 
of legislation have done so under the premise of banning the applica-
tion of all international or foreign law domestically in their courts.26  
                                                                                                                           
 19 See, e.g., S.B. 84, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012) (const. amend.); H.B. 1209, 2012 Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2012); S.B. 1360, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); S.B. 676, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2012). 
 20 See generally Sedensky, supra note 18. 
 21 S.B. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011); H.B 1353, 107th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (effective June 16, 2011) (codified at 2011 Tenn. Pub. Act. 497) (Both bills 
contain the following language: “Jihad and sharia are inextricably linked . . . [t]he unchanging 
and ultimate aim of jihad is the imposition of sharia on all states and nations, including the 
United States and this state; further, pursuant to its own dictates, sharia requires the abrogation, 
destruction, or violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions and the imposition of 
sharia through violence and criminal activity.”).   
 22 See Amaney Jamal, Muslim Americans: Enriching or Depleting American Democracy?, 
in RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: DANGER OR OPPORTUNITY? 89, 95 
(A. Wolfe & I. Katznelson eds., 2010).  A 2005 survey showed that “36 percent of the American 
population believes Islam encourages violence; another 36 percent reported that they have 
unfavorable opinions about Islam.” 
 23 See Russell Goldman, Bachmann Opposed to Sharia Law, Says it ‘Usurps’ Constitution, 
ABC NEWS (Nov. 2. 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/11/bachmann-opposed-to-
sharia-law-says-it-usurps-constitution. 
 24 Amy Sullivan, The Myth of Sharia Law in America, HUFFINGTON POST ONLINE (Jun. 15, 
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-sullivan/sharia-myth-america_b_876965.html (“We 
should have a federal law that says under no circumstances in any jurisdiction in the United 
States will sharia be used," Gingrich announced at last fall's Values Voters Summit). 
 25 Leah Nelson, Oklahoma’s Shariah Law Ban Creates Controversy, INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT, Spring 2011, available at http://www.splcenter.org. 
 26 Although most states have proposed blanket prohibitions without singling out Sharia 
law, the titles of some of the proposed legislation demonstrate the political impetus for enacting 
these laws. See, e.g., H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. 
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However, most of the legislations proposed ban the application of 
foreign law only if its application would not afford the same constitu-
tional rights guaranteed by the United States and the respective 
state’s constitution.27 Only one state, whose legislation was passed, ex-
pressly mentions Sharia law in its legislation.28  Since 2010, six states 
have passed legislation or constitutional amendments that ban the use 
of international and foreign law in their domestic courts.29  In 2012, 
Alabama, among other states, sought to introduce a constitutional 
amendment banning the application, use, or enforcement of foreign 
law that would contravene the state’s public policy.30  Two states, South 
Dakota and Kansas, enacted anti-Sharia legislation in 2012.31  South 
Dakota’s law expressly outlawed the application or enforcement of 
any religious law.32  Prior to the end of the 2012 legislative session, 
Michigan was attempting to pass its own controversial legislation.33 
The United States’ disdain for the application of foreign law is 
not imbedded in our judicial history to the extent that it is purported 
                                                                                                                           
Amend., amending art. 7, §1); S.B. 33, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012) (“American and Alabama Laws 
for Alabama Courts Amendment”). 
 27 See, e.g., S.R. 926, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (No recognition or enforcement of any 
foreign or religious law that is “contrary to or incompatible with” the U.S. Constitution or the 
Constitution of Georgia and the laws, including common law, recognized by the State of Geor-
gia). 
 28 OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD., STATE QUESTIONS FOR GENERAL ELECTION 7 (Nov. 2, 
2010) (Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment OK HJR 1056, Nov. 2010, which expressly 
bans courts from considering Sharia or international law in their decisions.), available at 
http://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/sq_gen10.pdf; see also H.B. 698, 106th Gen. Assemb., 
2012 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012) (like the Constitutional Amendment in Okla. this bill expressly 
singled out Sharia law in its language; bill died in committee). 
 29 H.B 2064, 50th Leg., 1st. Reg. Sesss. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effective 
Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22); H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess.  (Okla. 
2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend., amending art. 7, §1); H.B. 785, 1st Reg. Sess.(La. 
2010) (approved June 29, 2010; effective Aug. 15, 2010) (codified at 2011 La. R.S. 9:6000); H.B. 
3768, 106th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010) (approved May, 27, 2010) (codified at 2010 
Tenn. Pub. Act. 983; 2012); H.B. 1253, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (signed into law March 12, 
2012); S.B. 79, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (signed into law May 21, 2012). 
 30 See, e.g., S.B. 33, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012); S.J.R. 14, 2012 Reg. Sess. (N.M 2012) (all to 
be considered during the 2012 legislative session). 
 31 H.B. 1253, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (signed into law March 12, 2012); S.B. 79, 2012 
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (signed into law May 21, 2012). 
 32 H.B. 1253, 87th Leg. , Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (prevents any court or administrative body, 
including a private arbitration tribunal, from entering a judgment “predicated on a religious 
code, or enforce any provisions of any religious code”). 
 33 H.B. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011) (on calendar for a vote on December 14, 
2012); ‘Anti-Sharia’ Supporters Push for Action on Michigan House Bill Targeting Islamic Ideol-
ogy, HUFFINGTON POST ONLINE (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/26/anti-
sharia-law-michigan-house-bill_n_2192221.html (Several groups spoke out against Michigan’s 
legislation including the ACLU and Council on American-Islamic of Michigan). 
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today.34  In 1820, Justice Joseph Story cited more than twenty-five 
sources of foreign law.35  Justice Livingston criticized Justice Story not 
for his reliance on foreign law, but rather for the open definition that 
international law provided.36  The role of international or foreign law 
in domestic judicial decision-making has in recent years been hotly 
debated.37  In her 2009 confirmation hearings, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
was asked several times to state her position on the role of interna-
tional or foreign law in judicial decision making.38   
It is not unusual for domestic courts to enforce foreign law 
through choice-of-law clauses that are usually found in contracts or 
private law instruments such as wills, trusts, and financial instruments.39  
Legislation proposed or adopted in regards to a blanket prohibition 
on the use of foreign or international law by a domestic court would 
infringe on a court’s ability to enforce choice-of-law clauses.40  This 
type of legislation is bound to have its greatest impact on the utiliza-
tion of international dispute resolution mechanisms in the United 
States because these inevitably involve at least one foreign party and 
in many instances the application of foreign law.41  The legislation 
would specifically undermine arbitration proceedings because it 
would allow ex post facto attacks by the losing party on any award 
rendered on the basis of the foreign law chosen by the parties.42   In 
other words, the losing party could claim that the application of the 
foreign law would be contrary to the state’s public policy.43 
The haste in which states proposed these legislative provisions 
demonstrates a lack of proper consideration of the consequences of 
                                                                                                                           
 34 David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1417, 1427 (2006). 
 35 Id. at 1428. 
 36 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 181-82 (1820) (Livingston, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that Congress declared piracy to be defined by the “law of nations,” given how 
difficult it was hard for a defendant to figure out what constitutes the “law of nations”).  
 37 Supreme Court Justices Spar Over International Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 18, 2005), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105364112559&slreturn=1. 
 38 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, To Be An Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th. Cong. 132-33 (2009) (explaining her position on the role of international law in domestic 
legal decision-making) [hereinafter Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing]. 
 39 Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First Amend-
ment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 370 (2011).   
 40 Id.  
 41 Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and International 
Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1650-51 (1998) (“Arbitration as a means of 
effective international dispute resolution has grown rapidly over the last twenty-five years, and 
most transnational contracts today contain some provision for arbitration.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr., No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011). 
 43 Id. 
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enacting them into law.44  This type of legislation seeks to prevent state 
courts from exercising some of their most basic functions, including 
enforcement of commercial contracts, inter-country adoptions, foreign 
marriages, Native American treaties, foreign judgments, faith-based 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and cases of international child abduc-
tion.45  In addition to the intended goal of banning the application of 
Sharia by the courts,  this type of legislation carries with it many unin-
tended consequences including far-reaching effects on the enforceabil-
ity of international arbitration agreements and an increased uncer-
tainty in the outcome of litigation or arbitration.46 
II.  HISTORICAL UNDERPININGS OF CONTRACTUAL LAW 
Capitalism has flourished under a principle of “freedom to con-
tract,”47 which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.48  Freedom 
of contract represents the ultimate exercise of liberty, as embodied in 
the Declaration of Independence,49 between two parties to exchange 
resources.50  Contracts are based on the common law principle that 
“private agreements should be enforced in accordance with their 
terms.”51  Therefore, the ability of parties to enter into private agree-
ments and to resolve their private disputes through private arbitration 
is a legitimate exercise of the freedom guaranteed under the Four-
teenth Amendment.52   
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]here are compelling 
reasons why a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaf-
fected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power . . . 
should be given full effect.”53  In the words of Justice Erle, “[e]very 
man is the master of the contract he may choose to make: and it is of 
the highest importance that every contract should be construed ac-
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Dara Kam, Anti-Sharia Law Bill Heads to Senate Floor, PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 5, 
2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/state/”anti-sharia”-law-bill-heads-to-
senate-floor-2218704.html.  Although the bill eventually died in the Senate on Mar. 9, 2012, the 
Senate Committee only deliberated three minutes before signing off on the bill. 
 45 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 2-3 (40th ed. 2002). 
 48 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 49 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 50 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIETY 444 (Robert W. Kolb ed. 2008). 
 51 Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293 
(1975). 
 52 See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45. 
 53 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972); see also Larry E. Ribstein, 
Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 246-55 (1993) (“Uncertainty about choice-of-law 
at the time of litigation can increase both the costs and frequency of litigation.”). 
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cording to the intention of the contracting parties.”54  On that same 
note, in order to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties and 
increase judicial economy and predictability, courts generally give full 
effect to a parties’ valid choice-of-law clause.55   
Courts have found few exceptions to the policy of non-
interference with the freedom of contract, setting aside the provisions 
agreed upon by parties of a dispute only under certain limited circum-
stances.56  The common law has recognized grounds for disregarding 
contractual provisions under fraud, duress, incompetence, and uncon-
scionability.57   
The general rule is that parties should enjoy complete freedom to 
contract.58  In other words, “competent persons shall have the utmost 
liberty of contracting and that their agreements voluntarily and fairly 
made shall be held valid and enforced in the courts.”59  Courts have 
long held a view of non-interference with this freedom unless neces-
sary, based on public policy grounds.60    
This power to void a contract based on public policy is limited as 
recognized in Richmond v. Dubuque.61  In that case, the court noted 
the limits on its power to void a contract that contravenes public pol-
icy stating that this power “is a very delicate and undefined power, and, 
like the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, should be exercised only 
in cases free from doubt.”62    
Similarly, a result contrary to that which might result in a domes-
tic court under domestic law is an insufficient ground to reject a 
choice-of-law clause.63  Courts have recognized that the “fact that an 
international transaction may be subject to laws and remedies differ-
ent and less favorable than those of the United States” is not sufficient 
to justify the denial of that choice of law unless the law is inherently 
unfair.64 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Clarke v. Watson, [1865] 18 C.B. (N.S.) 278, 284, 144 Eng. Rep. 450, 452. 
 55 See, e.g., M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-15 (finding that “[t]he elimination of all such uncer-
tainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element 
in international trade, commerce, and contracting”).  
 56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
 57 See generally Epstein, supra note 51. 
 58 Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931). 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Syester v. Banta, 133 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Iowa 1965) (“Since the beginning of recorded 
history men and women have persisted in selling their birthrights for a mess of pottage and 
courts cannot protect against the folly of bad judgment.”). 
 61 Richmond v. Dubuque, 26 Iowa 191, 202 (1868). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 
(1985); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1297 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 64 Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992). 
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The Supreme Court has relied on “concerns of international com-
ity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, 
and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for 
predictability in the resolution of disputes” as a basis for its decision 
to enforce a party’s agreement.65 
The question then becomes whether the application of foreign 
law or international law in the arbitration of disputes goes against 
public policy.  As a starting point, the following section will provide an 
exploration of the limitations imposed on choice-of-law clauses. 
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws enumerates two 
main considerations for limiting the application of the contract’s 
choice of law.66  First, the contract’s choice of law should be utilized if 
the issue in dispute is one that the parties could have resolved by ex-
plicit provision in their agreement.67  Second, the law will be applied to 
the issue, even if an explicit provision would not have resolved it, 
unless (1) the chosen forum has no reasonable relationship to the par-
ties or the contract and no other reasonable basis is apparent or (2) 
the application of the law would be contrary to the state’s public pol-
icy, an interest that outweighs that of the state whose law was contrac-
tually chosen, and the determination of the issue, in the absence of a 
valid choice-of-law clause, would by default be governed by the law of 
that state.68  This latter exception has broad implications and requires 
the exploration of what is meant by “public policy.”  
The general rule is that any contract or foreign law that contra-
venes a state statute or constitution can be said to violate that state’s 
public policy.69  There are, however, instances where the contract itself 
does not violate a statute or constitutional provision, particularly 
where there is no statute on point to regulate the conduct at issue, but 
the court nevertheless finds the contract to be against the public pol-
icy of that forum.70  
                                                                                                                           
 65 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-19 
(1974).  
 66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See, e.g., Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“A contract which 
violates a provision of the constitution or a statute is void and illegal, and, will not be enforced in 
our courts.”). 
 70 See, e.g., Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(balancing the public interest that would served by enforcement versus the public interest that 
would be furthered by non-enforcement); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
178 (1981) (If no legislation regulates the conduct at issue, courts must weigh the parties' and 
public interest in enforcement of the contract against the strength of the public policy implicated 
by the contract and the furtherance of such policy by failure to enforce the contract.). 
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The term “public policy” itself is ambiguous.71  In the 1800s, Wil-
liam W. Story recognized this ambiguity when he pointed out that the 
nature of public policy is “so uncertain and fluctuating, varying with 
the habits and fashions of the day, with the growth of commerce and 
the usages of trade, that it is difficult to determine its limits with any 
degree of exactness.”72  In a more recent case in Florida, the court ac-
knowledged that “public policy” is not easily defined.73  The court in 
that case referred to public policy as “the community common sense 
and common conscience, extended and applied throughout the state 
to matters of public morals, public health, public safety, public welfare, 
and the like.”74   
If foreign law is implicated, a court determining which law to ap-
ply should reject the foreign law if it violates public policy.75  In the 
words of Justice Cardozo, one would need to find that the foreign law 
would “violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent 
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the com-
mon weal.”76  Contracts governed by foreign law may be found void or 
unenforceable if contrary to the forum state’s public policy.77  Florida 
has recognized that it cannot impose its public policy to prohibit the 
enforcement of a foreign contract outside its borders, but within its 
courts it may do so.78  In Alabama, a proposed constitutional amend-
ment defines its public policy “to prohibit anyone from requiring Ala-
bama courts to apply and enforce foreign laws.”79  By defining the ap-
plication of foreign law itself as against the state’s public policy, Ala-
bama has expressly excluded foreign law, regardless of whether the 
“foreign law” actually contravenes public policy as traditionally de-
fined by the courts.  In other words, Alabama’s knee-jerk reaction to 
enact legislation in this area has removed any discretion from the 
judges to consider public policy in their decisions. 
Notwithstanding Alabama’s proposed legislation, the definition 
of public policy generally remains vague and limitless in most states, 
and the issue now is whether our courts have done a good job of pro-
tecting judicial decisions from the influence of foreign law that con-
                                                                                                                           
 71 WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 675 (5th ed. 1874). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Harris v. Gonzalez, 789 So. 2d 405, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
 74 Id.  
 75 See, e.g., Willard v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 S.E.2d 776, 778 (Va. 1973).  
 76 Herbert F. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REV. 26, 33-34 (1938). 
 77 See, e.g., Turner v. Capitol Motors Transp. Co., 214 F. Supp. 545, 547 (D. Me. 1963). 
 78 Harris, 789 So. 2d at 409 (finding a contract unenforceable in Florida between a doctor 
and a supplement wholesaler because it violated public policy since the doctor would receive a 
portion of the profits in return for referring patients in violation of state legislation). 
 79 S.B. 33 § (b)(7), 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012). 
2012] The Impact of Anti-Sharia Legislation on Arbitration 191 
travenes United States’ public policy.  In other words, does our public 
policy warrant additional protections as zealously advanced by anti-
Sharia  organizations that fear the infiltration of foreign law into our 
judicial decisions?   
After looking at case law in various states where “anti-Sharia” 
legislation has been proposed, the only reasonable conclusion is that 
this type of legislation is not justified and only demonstrates a distrust 
of our judicial system.80  Before addressing this in more detail, an 
overview of United States courts’ treatment of choice-of-law clauses 
will demonstrate the historical and current practice of courts to allow 
parties to enter into contracts voluntarily, and, with very little limita-
tion, to allow parties to decide the law that will apply to their dispute. 
III. CASE LAW: GIVING EFFECT TO CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES 
Courts in the United States have a long history of giving effect to 
choice-of-law clauses unless doing so would violate a matter of public 
policy.81  Under the principle of freedom to contract, choice-of-law 
clauses are generally enforced so long as they do not violate a public 
policy and there is a reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of law.82 
A choice-of-law clause allows parties to a contract to choose the 
law that will govern their contract and that which will apply should a 
dispute arise.83  Legislation banning the use or application of foreign, 
Sharia, or international law would have a significant effect on parties’ 
ability to freely choose the norms by which to govern their contracts 
and to freely consent to the application of a particular law.84  Respect 
for a party’s choice-of-law provides predictability and confidence to 
the parties that the court will enforce their contractual rights based on 
the norms to which they have consented.85  Otherwise, parties’ expec-
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Nothing to Fear: Debunking the Mythical “Sharia Threat” to Our Judicial System, 1, 5 
ACLU (May 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_ 
Report_FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf; Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 81 See, e.g., L’Arbalete, Inc. v. Zaczac, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting 
that choice-of-law provisions are presumed valid unless the party seeking to avoid enforcement 
of them sufficiently carries the burden of showing that the foreign law contravenes strong public 
policy of the forum jurisdiction).  
 82 Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (find-
ing that there was a reasonable basis for the choice of Swiss law and application of Swiss law to 
award attorney fees to prevailing party would not violate public policy). 
 83 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (9th ed. 2009) (choice-of-law clause is defined as “a 
contractual provision by which the parties designate the jurisdiction whose law will govern any 
disputes that may arise between the parties”). 
 84 See Dispelling Threat of Sharia, supra note 17. 
 85 Charles R. Calleros, Toward Harmonization and Certainty in Choice-of-Law Rules For 
International Contracts: Should the U.S. Adopt the Equivalent of Rome I?, 28 WIS. INT’L L. J. 639, 
641-42 (2011). 
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tations would be unprotected, and the resulting lack of certainty and 
unpredictability would undermine the contractual relationship and 
commitment to perform as agreed upon.86 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the presumptive 
validity of choice of forum and choice-of-law provisions.87  In M/S 
Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., the Court held that courts should en-
force choice of law clauses in cases of “freely negotiated private inter-
national agreement[s].”88  The Court, in essence, affirmed the right of 
contracting parties to choose their method of dispute resolution.89    
The Court went on to state that choice-of-law clauses are gener-
ally enforceable, subject to the following limitations: (1) choice of law 
must be unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bar-
gaining power; (2) enforcement of chosen laws must not be unreason-
able or unjust to the party seeking a remedy; and (3) enforcement of 
the choice of law must not be contrary to public policy.90   
States have also recognized choice-of-law provisions granting 
them presumed validity91 “unless the party seeking to avoid enforce-
ment of them sufficiently carries the burden of showing that the for-
eign law contravenes strong public policy of the forum jurisdiction.”92  
Placing the burden on the party attempting to avoid enforcement of a 
foreign law in an international transaction reinforces the premise 
“that American parochialism would hinder the expansion of Ameri-
can business and trade, and more generally, interfere with the smooth 
functioning and growth of global commerce.”93  
A. Choice of Law in Arbitration 
In arbitration, the freedom of the parties is generally broader 
than in traditional judicial proceedings because party autonomy is at 
the heart of arbitration.94  A voluntary and consensual process drives 
arbitration.95  Parties have the ability to agree to choose procedural 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. 
 87 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). 
 88 Id. at 12. 
 89 Id. at 12-14. 
 90 Id. at 14-18. 
 91 See, e.g., Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 761 So. 2d. 306, 311 (Fla. 
2000); Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007); Richards v. Lloyd’s of Lon-
don, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 92 See, e.g., L’Arbalete Inc. v. Zaczac, 474 F. Supp. 2d. 1314, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 93 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 420 
(1996); see M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. 
 94 See Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice-of-Law in Com-
mercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. R. 59, 59-61 (2005). 
 95 See id. at 59. 
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rules, control the range of the remedies to some extent, and choose 
the substantive law to govern their contract.96  In part, this is due to the 
need to assure predictability in the commercial contractual setting.97 
Historically, choice-of-law clauses in arbitration agreements were 
not greeted as warmly in the United States as choice-of-law clauses in 
contracts seeking enforcement in judicial settings.98  This attitude has 
since changed.99  This shift was best reflected in the Mitsubishi opinion: 
As international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has 
the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in 
the course of that trade. . . . If [arbitration tribunals] are to take a 
central place in the international legal order, national courts will 
need to “shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,” (cita-
tion omitted) and also their customary and understandable un-
willingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic 
law to a foreign or transnational tribunal.100 
Now in conflict of law decisions, party autonomy has become in-
creasingly respected by jurisdictions across the world.101 
In contracts involving interstate commerce, which include an ar-
bitration clause, federal law prempts state law in governing the en-
forceability of those contracts.  Specifically, the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”)102 applies to interstate contracts and “establishes a na-
tional policy favoring arbitration when the parties contract for that 
                                                                                                                           
 96 U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, art. 5, 8, 19, 28, 34, 36, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006).  
 97 See generally Kuehn v. Childrens Hospital, Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir. 1997). 
Generally, choice-of-law clauses are enforced because of the need to provide predictability to the 
parties and to protect the parties' expectations, and therefore in the absence of a valid choice-of-
law clause, the parties expectations would not be frustrated by the court’s choice-of-law deter-
mination. 
 98 Buys, supra note 94, at 63-64 (quoting J. Stewart McClendon & Rosable E. Everard 
Goodman, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 114 (1986); see also 
M/S Bremen, 409 U.S. at 9-10 (recognizing that historically “[m]any courts, federal and state, have 
declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that 
their effect was to ‘oust the jurisdiction of the court’”). 
 99 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974) (finding that “a contractual provi-
sion specifying in advance the forum for litigating disputes and the law to be applied is an almost 
indispensable precondition to achieving the orderliness and predictability essential to any inter-
national business transaction”). 
 100 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (quot-
ing Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). 
 101 Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between States: Justifying 
Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 381, 385 (2008). The Institute of 
International Law calls party autonomy “one of the fundamental principles in private interna-
tional law.” Id.; Institute of International Law, Resolution on the Autonomy of the Parties in In-
ternational Contracts Between Private Persons or Entities, 64 II Y.B. 383 (1991). 
 102 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
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mode of dispute resolution.”103  Even when parties have chosen state 
law to control the contract, the arbitration clause is governed by the 
FAA.104  The Supreme Court has held that in interstate commercial 
transactions, the FAA preempts state law in enforcing an agreement 
to arbitrate.105  Although the FAA contains preemptive force in favor 
of arbitration, this power may be limited in state court proceedings.106 
For example, the FAA’s procedural rules do not necessarily apply in 
state proceedings.107  However, FAA’s substantive rules would apply in 
federal as well as state courts.108  This would lead to the conclusion that 
the FAA preempts any state law, including any anti-Sharia legislation 
that would bar the enforcement of a party’s choice-of-law clause in a 
contract or arbitration agreement. 
In Preston v. Ferrer,  the United States Supreme Court reinforced 
the federal policy favoring arbitration by emphasizing that this “na-
tional policy . . . applies in state as well as federal courts [and] fore-
closes any state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”109  This language strongly suggests that parties 
attempting to stay arbitration proceedings on the grounds that foreign 
law is being applied would be forced, unless otherwise provided for in 
their contract, to decide those issues before an arbitration panel.110 
Turning to the anti-Sharia and anti-foreign or international law 
statutes promulgated by a large portion of the states’ legislatures, the 
issue then becomes not whether the arbitration tribunal would not 
enforce the parties’ choice of law, but if they did, would the arbitral 
award be enforceable?  In a hypothetical situation, two parties sign a 
contract with both arbitration and choice-of-law clauses that require 
that the arbitration be governed by Sharia law. Subsequently, the par-
                                                                                                                           
 103 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275-76, 281 (1995) (holding 
where object of contract containing arbitration clause involves interstate commerce, clause is 
enforceable under FAA). 
 106 See Howard S. Suskin & Stuart D. Polizzi, A Cautionary Reminder About the Unique 
Application of the Federal Arbitration Act in State Court Proceedings, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
2066 (2006). 
 107 Id.; see also Atl. Painting & Contracting Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d 841, 846-
47 (Ky. 1984); Simmons Co. v. Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp., 532 S.E.2d 436, 439-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000). 
 108 M. Praveen Chakravarthy, Philosophy of Commercial Arbitration, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(June 4, 1999). 
 109 Preston, 552 U.S. at 353 (citing Southland Corp., v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). 
 110 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-49 (2006) (finding that 
“regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the valid-
ity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitra-
tor”); see generally Archis A. Parasharami & Kevin Ranlett, Supreme Court Addresses Volt’s 
Choice-of-Law Trap: Is the End of the Problem in Sight?, 64 DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 26 (2009). 
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ties submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal.  The arbitration panel 
applies Sharia law and issues an award in favor of one party.  Thereaf-
ter, the winning party seeks enforcement of that award in Oklahoma 
which has enacted anti-Sharia legislation.111  Following these hypo-
thetical facts, the court in Oklahoma would now have to vacate the 
award on the basis that it violates state law because the court, under 
the new constitutional amendment, “shall not consider international 
law or Sharia law.” 
Anti-Sharia legislation banning the application of foreign or in-
ternational law has implications for judicial comity between states and 
foreign nations.  Legislation banning the application of foreign or 
Sharia law would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.112  This clause requires that “Full Faith and Credit shall 
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Pro-
ceedings of every other State.”113  Therefore, if a court in a state that 
does not have this outright ban on the consideration of foreign or 
Sharia law enforces an arbitration award that relied on foreign or 
Sharia law, the parties in that arbitration may be at risk of not having 
that judgment recognized in another state.  
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to for-
eign judgments,114 the United States under a principle of comity en-
forces foreign judgments domestically.115  However, except where pre-
empted by federal law,116 enforcement of foreign judgments is left to 
the discretion of state courts.117  Therefore, state legislation that bans 
the consideration of foreign law would threaten this long-standing 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (upholding the district court’s preliminary 
injunction preventing certification of State Question 755 “Save our State” Amendment to Okla-
homa’s Constitution banning the application of international or Sharia law by the state’s courts). 
 112 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 109 (3d Cir. 1969) (the 
recognition of a foreign decree is based on principles of comity, rather than full faith and credit).  
 115 See, e.g., Laskosky v. Laskosky, 504 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 1987) (upholding Canadian 
judgment in child custody case that involved a mother from Mississippi); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1988).  
 116 The United States is a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”), which has been in force since 
June 7, 1959. The New York Convention requires members to domestically recognize foreign 
arbitral awards. For the Convention’s text, see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/ 
arbitration/NYConvention.html.  In addition, the United States is signatory to the Hague Con-
vention on Choice of Court Agreements, which requires members to recognize each other’s 
judgments in cases between parties to an international commercial transaction.  The Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was concluded on Jun. 30, 2005, but has not entered 
into force as of Jan. 1 2012.  For a list of signatories as of February 23, 2012, see 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/statmtrx_e.pdf.   
 117 Laskosky, 504 So. 2d at 729. 
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practice of judicial comity and make enforcement vulnerable for any 
United States judgment seeking recognition abroad.118  These and 
other effects would be many of the unintended consequences of en-
acting blanket prohibitions on the application of foreign or interna-
tional law. 
B. Domestic Application of Choice of Law  
The anti-Sharia movement cites a sample of fifty appellate court 
cases, claiming that judges in these cases deferred to Sharia law con-
trary to the United States Constitution and state public policy.119 A 
look at some of those cases that involved either arbitration agree-
ments or contracts, in keeping with this paper’s focus, will demonstrate 
that the fear of Sharia infiltrating the United States’ justice system is 
unfounded.  
In Abd Alla v. Mourssi, the parties had agreed to Islamic arbitra-
tion in the event that a dispute arose involving their partnership 
agreement.120  One of the parties filed a motion to vacate the Islamic 
Arbitration Committee’s award.121  In addition to the fact that the de-
fendant had failed to file a challenge within the time limitation, the 
court found that absent “any fraud, corruption or other undue means,” 
the court was required to enforce the award.122  The court simply ap-
plied “neutral principles” of contract law to enforce a valid agreement, 
as it would do in any other arbitration agreement dispute regardless of 
whether the parties had chosen secular or religious law to govern their 
dispute.123 
Another case cited by proponents of anti-Sharia law124 is a case 
involving a former Islamic minister who sued an Islamic center and its 
members alleging defamation and other contractual claims, including 
breach of contract.125 The court in that case found that because the 
claims required the interpretation of Islamic law, the court lacked sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute.126  Not able to apply neu-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See, e.g., Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 16; see also Republic of the Phil. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d. Cir. 1995) (“But while it is true that principles of comity 
cannot compel a domestic court to uphold foreign interests at the expense of the public policies 
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 119 CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 16, at 8.  
 120 Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 570-71 (Minn Ct. App. 2004). 
 121 Id. at 571-72. 
 122 Id. at 573. 
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 124 CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 16, at 36. 
 125 El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 793 (Ark. 2006). 
 126 Id. at 795-96. 
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tral principles of law to decide the issue in accordance the First 
Amendment, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision that it did 
not have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the claim.127  Contrary to 
the fact that it was cited among the top twenty cases to demonstrate 
that Sharia law is “infiltrating” the United States legal system,128 this 
case demonstrates that current domestic law and the application of 
United States constitutional principles by domestic courts already 
serve to protect our constitutional rights. 
IV.  EFFECT OF PROPOSED & ENACTED LEGISLATION 
Oklahoma became the first state to enact a constitutional 
amendment on this issue.129  Voters in Oklahoma overwhelmingly 
voted in support of a constitutional amendment that banned the con-
sideration of international law, expressly mentioning Sharia law.130    
Other states followed suit in proposing similar legislation.131  
However, most states in an attempt to avoid First Amendment issues 
eliminated any specific reference to Sharia law.132  Proposed legislation 
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Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011) (carried over from 2011 leg. sess.); H.B. 1512, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d. Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2012); S.B. 676, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2nd. Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); H.B. 1422, 2012 Reg. 
Sess. (N.H. 2012); S.J.R. 14, 2012 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2012); H.B. 640, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 
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(W. Va. 2011) (carried over from 2011 leg. sess.). 
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by other states provided for a blanket prohibition of any “foreign law, 
legal code or system.”133  States preempting any constitutional attacks 
on First Amendment grounds opted for the blanket ban with the aim 
of preventing the use and application of Sharia law.134  This focus on 
Sharia is ironic considering that many legislators were unable to cite 
to a single decision where a court imposed Sharia law contrary to pub-
lic policy135 and in some instances could not even provide a definition 
of Sharia law.136    
A. What is “foreign law”? 
States purporting to ban the application of Sharia law through a 
ban on foreign law must first look to whether Sharia law can be con-
sidered “foreign law” under the proposed and enacted legislation.137  
Louisiana, in its legislation, defined “foreign law” as any “law, rule, or 
legal code of a jurisdiction outside of the states and territories of the 
United States.”138  While other states specifically included religious law 
as part of their definition of “foreign law.”139  However, those states 
that enacted their proposed bills or constitutional amendments inter-
estingly did not include religious law as part of their definition of 
“foreign law.”140 
Textually, foreign law under that above definition captures any 
law promulgated by a foreign sovereign, but it is less clear whether 
that would include religious law.141  Sharia law, in particular, has influ-
enced the legal codes in most Muslim countries.142  It is based on the 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See, e.g., H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (approved on Apr. 12, 2011, 
effective Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22).  
 134 Bill Banning Sharia Law Meets Protests, Questions of Constitutionality, NEWS SERVICE 
OF FLORIDA (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.sunshineslate.com/2012/02/29/bill-sharia-law-protests. 
 135 Awad v. Ziriax,  670 F.3d 1111, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2012) (in considering whether the State 
of Oklahoma had asserted a compelling interest, the court found that the state did not identify 
an actual problem based on the fact that “they did not know of even a single instance where an 
Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law”). 
 136 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 137 Id. (discussing Missouri H.R. Hearing). 
 138 See S.B. 1274, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 785, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010).  Similar 
definitions also adopted by H.B. 3490, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess.  (S.C. 2011); S.B. 
308, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011); H.B. 525, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.B. 
4769, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); L.D. 1076, 125th Leg., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011); H.B. 2087, 
2011 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011); H.F. 489, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); H.B. 242, 
2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); H.B. 45,  2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011). 
 139 See e.g., H.F. 575, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011); H.B. 301, 2011 
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011).   
 140 See e.g., H.B. 785, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010) (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 9:6000).  
 141 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defines foreign law, generally as “the law of 
another country”). 
 142 Toni Johnson, Islam: Governing Under Sharia,  COUNSEL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034 (last updated Oct. 24, 2011). 
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Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed.143  While in some 
countries Sharia is the source of the law, in many other Muslim coun-
tries it operates as a separate legal system and is applied at the discre-
tion of the parties in certain familial and financial conflicts.144   
It is important to note that the Qur’an requires Muslims to be 
loyal to their state of residence and that religion must not be a matter 
of the state.145  Under this doctrine, Muslims living in the United States, 
as a sign of their loyalty, would then necessarily be inclined to adhere 
to the United States Constitution.146  This proposition has also been 
supported by other United States experts on Sharia law who have 
recognized that Sharia law, except for some fundamental tenets, is ex-
pected to change depending on time and place and will not be applied 
if it goes against an individual or community’s public interest.147 
Sharia does not fit the formal definition of “foreign law” for the 
following reasons: (1) it exists separate from a sovereign state;148 (2) it 
is founded upon religions edicts, not on the democratic consensus of 
individuals; (3) it provides moral guidance for individuals in areas be-
yond the normal boundaries of state law, providing duties rather than 
rights to individuals;149 and (4) religious rules are usually not codified 
and can vary between different religious communities observing the 
same faith.150   
Critics have urged that it would be a mistake to consider Sharia 
law as simply a religious code because it governs all behavior in the 
secular sphere.151  However, Sharia, like Jewish law or Catholic Canon, 
is imbedded in our society through an individual’s religious choice and 
is not imposed on individuals by a foreign state or government.152  A 
federal district court in Oklahoma interpreted Oklahoma’s recently 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Qasim Rashid, Sharia Law: The Five Things Every Non-Muslim (and Muslim) Should 
Know, HUFFINGTON POST/MUSLIM WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/qasim-rashid/shariah-law-the-five-things-every-non-
muslim_b_1068569.html. 
 146 Id.; see also Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 147 Dispelling the Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 148 Sharia law is a religion, which therefore exists separate from the existence of state laws 
and regulations.  However, many states, such as Egypt, have based their laws on Sharia principles.  
 149 Sharia addresses personal matters such as sexual intercourse, hygiene, adultery, diet, 
prayer and fasting.  
 150 See generally Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 151 See Bill Gertz, Shariah a Danger to U.S., Security Pros Say, THE WASH. TIMES (Sept. 14, 
2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/14/shariah-a-danger-to-us-security-pros-
say/?page=all. 
 152 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17.  
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enacted Constitutional amendment’s reference to Sharia law as a ref-
erence to religious beliefs rather than a legal system.153   
In light of the above definition of Sharia law, proposed and en-
acted state legislation creating blanket prohibitions on the application 
of foreign law may be subject to a wide variety of interpretations by 
the courts including one that may find that Sharia is not considered 
“foreign law.”  This would undermine the entire objective of some of 
these “anti-Sharia” laws which cloaked themselves under otherwise 
neutral and seemingly non-discriminatory language.154  
B. Redundancy of Legislation 
The application of foreign and international law has already been 
limited by the requirement that it not contradict state and Federal 
constitutions.155  This has been the guiding principle in the United 
States’ history of jurisprudence without the need for enacting an addi-
tional all-out ban on the application of foreign law.156  The law, prior to 
the proposed legislation, already gave guidance to judges on exercis-
ing their discretion when applying foreign law by requiring the appli-
cation to be consistent with constitutional principles.157  In essence, 
effective mechanisms are already in place in the United States’ judi-
cial system to prevent courts from impermissibly becoming entangled 
in religion or considering a religious code as a basis for their deci-
sions.158 
The United States was founded on the adoption of foreign law.159  
For example, Florida declared the common law of England, prior to 
                                                                                                                           
 153 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04 (W. D. Okla. 2010) (court found that Okla-
homa resident had proved substantial likelihood of success on the merits that amendment to the 
Oklahoma Constitution to forbid state courts from considering or using international law or 
Sharia law violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment ); See also,  John R. Crook, Oklahoma Constitutional Amendment Barring Consideration of 
Sharia and International Law Overwhelmingly Approved by Voters, Preliminarily Enjoined by 
U.S. Court, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 123 (2011). 
 154 Most legislation in order to appear neutral does not single out a prohibition against 
Sharia, but rather prohibits the application of foreign law that would be against a State’s public 
policy.  See, e.g., H.B. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011)(approved on Apr. 12, 2011, effec-
tive Apr. 13, 2011) (codified at 2011 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 22).  
 155 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Omar Scaribery, Islamic Law Ban in State Court Petitioned by Muslims, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/12/muslims-ban-islamic-
law_n_959104.html. 
 158 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 159 See, e.g., Ind. Code § 1-1-2-1 (2000) (Indiana’s reception statute: “the law governing this 
state is declared to be …(4) The common law of England, and statutes of the British Parliament 
made in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of reign of James the First…, and which are of general 
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the Declaration of Independence, to be in force provided that it was 
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States 
and the acts of Florida’s legislature.160   
The legislation being proposed is based upon an unfounded fear 
that judges will disregard their constitutional duties and exercise their 
discretion in favor of applying foreign law or, as the majority seems to 
fear, Sharia law.161  While courts have applied foreign law, the applica-
tion has occurred with the limitation that it not be inconsistent with 
domestic laws and state and federal constitutions.162  
Contrary to what critics cite as a justification for the enactment of 
anti-Sharia type legislation,163 Sharia law is not infiltrating our judicial 
system.164  In fact, Oklahoma, the first to enact such anti-Sharia legisla-
tion, admitted to not having any evidence that Sharia law is being im-
posed by their state courts.165    
As far as religion is concerned, the First Amendment already lim-
its the role that courts may undertake when resolving disputes involv-
ing religious doctrine or practice.166  However, the First Amendment 
does not prevent the resolution of religious disputes so long as the 
court bases its decision on “neutral principles of law.”167  In other 
words, the court cannot perform an “inquiry into religious doctrine,” 
but rather has to base its decision on secular principles such as con-
                                                                                                                           
nature, not local to that kingdom, and not inconsistent with the first, second, and third specifica-
tions of this section”). 
 160 Fla. Stat. § 2.01 (2011). 
 161 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17 (every judge takes an oath to uphold the laws of 
the State/United State and the U.S. Constitution). 
 162 Chamara v. Yatim, 937 N.E.2d 490, 495 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (no deference was due to 
the custody order issued by a Jaafarite religious tribunal (Jaafarite Court) in Lebanon because 
the custody order was not made in “substantial conformity” with Massachusetts law); Amin v. 
Bakhaty, 798 So. 2d 75, 86 (La. 2001) (refusing to enforce Egyptian court order granting custody 
to father since that order was not based on “best interests of the child” and therefore against 
Louisiana’s public policy); see generally ACLU Report, Nothing to Fear, supra note 80.  
 163 See generally CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 16. 
 164 ACLU Report, Nothing to Fear, supra note 80 at 1.   
 165 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17; see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th 
Cir. 2012).   
 166 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”); see also Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1968) (holding that “restraints of 
First Amendment, as applied to states through Fourteenth Amendment, forbid a civil court from 
awarding church property on basis of interpretation and significance the civil court assigns to 
aspects of church doctrine”). 
 167 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979) (establishing that the “neutral principles ap-
proach” prevents courts from entanglement with religious doctrine while granting flexibility to 
resolve the dispute). 
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tractual rights.168  States have recognized this doctrine in domestic arbi-
tration cases.169   
In Avitzur v. Avitzur, a Jewish couple signed a “Ketubah” with an 
agreement that recognized the Beth Din, a rabbinical tribunal, as hav-
ing authority over their marriage.170  Although the husband had ob-
tained a divorce through a civil court, the wife was not considered di-
vorced until she obtained a Jewish divorce or “Get” in accordance 
with their marital agreement.171  The court in Avitzur found that the 
First Amendment did not prevent it from enforcing the couples’ mar-
riage agreement, which required them to go before the Beth Din.172  A 
“neutral principles of law” approach allowed the court to enforce the 
secular portions of the Ketubah, which required the enforcement of 
the husband’s promise to refer any marital disputes to the Beth Din.173  
The court reinforced the Supreme Court’s precedent when it stated 
that “to the extent that an enforceable promise can be found by the 
application of neutral principles of contract law,” the court may re-
solve the dispute without interfering with religious practice or law.174 
Similar protections against enforcing any contract or law that 
would be against public policy also exist in the world of international 
arbitration.  The United Nations Convention on Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the "New York Con-
vention”) is the main instrument governing the enforcement of com-
mercial international arbitration agreements and awards.175   
Under the New York Convention, state signatories would enforce 
an international award arising from another party-state to the Con-
vention.176  The United States ratified the New York Convention and 
thus is bound to domestically recognize foreign arbitration awards 
from other party-states.177  Federal courts, in addition to state courts, 
have jurisdiction to enforce arbitral awards.178  The Convention already 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Id. 
 169 See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983) (deciding whether the court 
had a proper role in deciding the enforceability of a Ketubah, an agreement entered into as part 
of a Jewish marriage). 
 170 Id.  
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 138-39. 
 173 Id. at 139. 
 174 Id.  
 175 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. 
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Jun. 10, 1958, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf. [hereinafter N.Y. 
Convention]. 
 176 Id. at art. 1. 
 177 United States ratified the N.Y. Convention in Sept. 30, 1970. 
 178 9 U.S.C.A. § 205 (2012); see also Fiske, Emery & Ass’n v. Ajello, 577 A. 2d 1139 (Conn. 
Super Ct. 1989). 
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allows a state signatory to refuse recognition of the award if it is con-
trary to the enforcing state’s own public policy.179  State legislation 
purporting to limit the application of foreign law to recognize a for-
eign arbitration award would be preempted by this Convention under 
the Supremacy Clause.180   
C. Separation of Powers 
The language utilized in some of the proposed legislation threat-
ens to violate the separation of powers doctrine.  Restricting the judi-
ciary from considering foreign law may infringe upon the judiciary’s 
ability to be the sole interpreter of the nation’s laws.181  This would be 
exemplified where a court is facing the enforcement of a foreign 
judgment, arbitral award, or a choice-of-law clause in a private con-
tract between parties.182   
It has long been recognized by many state courts that the legisla-
ture is not permitted to restrict, encroach, or infringe the inherent 
powers of the judicial body.183  Interpretation of a statute, choice-of-law 
clause, or foreign arbitral award is within the inherent powers of the 
judiciary, which may require the interpretation and application of for-
eign law.184  The question is whether the proposed legislation unduly 
impairs an exercise of inherent judicial powers.185 
 One of the inherent powers recognized is the “power to take actions 
reasonably necessary to administer justice efficiently, fairly, and eco-
                                                                                                                           
 179 N.Y. Convention, supra note 175 at art. V. (2)(b) (Recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition 
and enforcement is sought find that (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country). 
 180 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984) (“[I]n  enacting § 2 of the Federal 
Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the 
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties 
agreed to resolve by arbitration”). 
 181 Cf. Florida Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, Feb 29, 2012, available at 
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/1360. 
 182 See, e.g.,Mansour v. Islamic Educ. Ctr. of Tampa, No. 08-CA-3497 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Mar. 
22, 2011). 
 183 Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Grp. Retail, Inc., 895 So. 2d 225 (Ala. 2004); 
Kerns v. CSE Ins. Grp., 106 Cal. App. 4th 368, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754 (1st Dist. 2003); State v. 
McCahill, 261 Conn. 492, 811 A.2d 667 (2002); Adair Architects, Inc. v. Bruggeman, 346 Ill. App. 
3d 523, 281 Ill. Dec. 938, 805 N.E. 2d 306 (3d Dist. 2004); Hoag v. State, 889 So. 2d 1019 (La. 2004); 
Querubin v. Com., 440 Mass. 108, 795 N.E. 2d 534 (2003); Spitznas v. State, 1982 OK CR 115, 648 
P.2d 1271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or. 425, 51 P.3d 1232 (2002); 
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 315 N.W. 2d 703 (1982). 
 184 See generally Parasharami, supra note 110 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of choice-of-law clauses).  
 185 Ex parte Dozier, 262 Ala. 197, 199, 77 So. 2d 903, 905 (1953).  
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nomically.”186  Legislation that bans courts from considering interna-
tional, Sharia, or foreign law would infringe upon this power.187     
In Iowa, the proposed bill includes limiting the sources that 
judges could utilize for interpreting the Constitution,188 which is con-
trary to Supreme Court precedent in Lawrence v. Texas,189 Roper v. 
Simmons,
190
 Thompson v. Oklahoma,191 and Graham v. Florida,192 all of 
which considered foreign and international norms in reaching their 
decisions.193  In the most recent case of Graham v. Florida, the Court 
reflected on its consideration of foreign law, by stating that it has 
treated the laws and practices of other nations and international 
agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment not because those 
norms are binding or controlling but because the judgment of the 
world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent 
with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s ration-
ale has respected reasoning to support it.194 
While it must be acknowledged that members of the Supreme 
Court are often at odds with each other over whether international 
law can serve as a judicial source for interpretation,195 it must also be 
recognized that these “anti-Sharia” laws would prevent not only inter-
national and foreign source reference but would also prevent en-
forcement of validly entered contracts and arbitration awards.196  
                                                                                                                           
 186 See, e.g., Matter of Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1988).  
 187 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (The court looked to international 
human rights standards and other countries treatment of the issue in reaching a decision that 
“[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human 
freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmen-
tal interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”). 
 188 H. J.R. 14, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2011) (constitutional amendment prohib-
iting the courts of this state from using international law when exercising judicial power) (legisla-
tion was carried over from 2011 session). 
 189 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 190 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty should not be 
applicable if the offense was committed when the individual was under the age of eighteen).   
 191 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 (1988). 
 192 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (court acknowledged law of foreign nations in 
support of its finding that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eight 
Amendment). 
 193 See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033; Lawrence, 439 U.S. at 598; Roper, 543 U.S. at 554; 
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868. 
 194 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.  
 195 See Transcript of Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, Scalia-Breyer 
Debate, presented by U.S. Association of Constitutional Law, at American University, Jan. 13, 
2005, transcript available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts (last visited 
Jan 28, 2012). 
 196 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
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D. Contrary to Existing Laws and U.S. Policy 
Some of the states proposing anti-Sharia laws have failed to no-
tice how this legislation will interact with other legislation already in 
place.197  Take for instance, Missouri, which proposed a ban on state 
court’s consideration of foreign law, including Sharia law.198  The Mis-
souri Constitution contains a prohibition against enacting any law that 
would impair a contract.199  The Constitution specifically states, “[t]hat 
no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or 
retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of spe-
cial privileges or immunities, can be enacted.”200 However, legislation 
banning the application or use of foreign law will do just that to par-
ties who voluntarily enter into contracts that apply foreign law.201 
Legislation that seeks to ban the interpretation and/or applica-
tion of foreign law also undermines our history of international com-
ity.202  Comity in the United States “has served as a principle of defer-
ence to foreign law and foreign courts.”203  While comity is not without 
its limitations, it has given courts discretion to enforce foreign judg-
ments.  Treaties now regulate much of comity where countries have 
agreed to recognize each other judgments in cases of international 
arbitration and commercial contract disputes.204  In fact, courts now 
justify their application of comity out of deference of party autonomy, 
demonstrating a shift in the view of international comity.205  This shift 
has signaled a view that comity is exercised less out of judicial discre-
tion and more out of legal obligation.206  The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the importance of protecting the autonomy of private parties 
by finding that concerns of international comity, respect for the ca-
pacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the 
resolution of disputes require enforcement of the parties’ agreement, 
                                                                                                                           
 197 Id. 
 198 H.B. 708, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011) (passed by House, died on Senate 
floor). 
 199 MO. CONST. art. I, § 13 (2011). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Dispelling Sharia Threat, supra note 17. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
19, 20 (2008); see generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 204 See, e.g., N.Y. Convention, supra note 175. But cf., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 
(1895) (recognizing a divorce decree issued in a foreign country on the basis of comity). 
 205 Paul, supra note 203, at 20, 27. 
 206 Id. at 29-30.  
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even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a do-
mestic context.207 
While the principle of comity is not obligatory on a court, new 
legislation either prohibiting the consideration of foreign law or re-
quiring the foreign law to adhere to our constitutional standards will 
likely decrease judicial economy and make judges more hesitant in 
granting comity to foreign judgments.  
E. A Look at Bills Signed into Law   
1. Oklahoma’s Constitutional Amendment 
Out of those states that have enacted legislation in this area, 
Oklahoma is unique in that it specifically singled out Sharia law.208  
Although there has not been a single case in which Sharia law has 
been applied,209 legislators characterize the law as a necessary “pre-
emptive” strike.210   
The constitutional amendment has yet to be certified to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court due to a pending constitutional challenge 
on the grounds that it violates the Establishment Clause of the United 
States Constitution.211  The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed the U.S. 
District Court’s decision to issue an injunction finding that the consti-
tutional amendment, forbidding courts from considering Sharia or 
international law, violated the First Amendment’s Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clause.212 
On the merits of the issue, the plaintiff in this case have put forth 
arguments that this amendment is tantamount to the government dis-
approving of his religion because it specifically singles out Sharia 
                                                                                                                           
 207 Id. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
629 (1985). 
 208 See generally, Awad v. Ziriax,  670 F.3d 1111 ( 10th Cir. 2012).  Only one other state has 
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law.213  The Amendment is not neutral on its face, as it expressly pro-
hibits the consideration of Sharia law.214  It also fails to define Sharia 
law, leaving room for ambiguity in the application and interpretation 
of this constitutional amendment.215  
The Tenth Circuit found that Oklahoma’s constitutional amend-
ment discriminated against religions despite appellant’s argument that 
the amendment banned all religious laws from Oklahoma courts.216  
The court in this case focused on the fact that by its plain language, 
the amendment singled out Sharia law twice in its text.217  In the end, 
the Tenth Circuit reiterated its position that “while the public has an 
interest in the will of the voter[s] being carried out… the public has a 
more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s 
constitutional rights.”218 
Besides banning the application of Sharia law, Oklahoma’s con-
stitutional amendment also enjoins the consideration of international 
law.219  This provision in the amendment appears to violate Article VI 
of the U.S. Constitution.220  Treaties signed by the United States consti-
tute binding international law on all fifty states of the United States.221  
Unlike other proposed legislation, Oklahoma does not explicitly ex-
clude treaties signed by the United States.222 According to the current 
language of the Oklahoma constitutional amendment, a court could 
interpret it to prevent the application of an international treaty, in 
violation of the Supremacy Clause.223   
There is also the issue of international customary law.  While it 
has not been incorporated into federal law, the Supreme Court has 
declared certain international customary law norms which are suffi-
ciently well defined and accepted by a wide majority of nation states, 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Crook, supra note 153; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (“courts should refrain 
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 214 H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend., 
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 219 H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend., 
amending art. 7, §1) (“The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. 
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia law.”). 
 220 U.S. CONST. art. VI (“All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”). 
 221 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 222 H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010) (Okla. “Save Our State” Const. Amend., 
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 223 See id.  
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as part of federal law.224  This legislation would prohibit any court from 
enforcing any international customary norms already recognized by 
the United States and enforceable as Supreme Court precedent.225  It 
would also likely restrict the judiciary from looking at sources of 
American law that are based on international norms.226 
It is also unclear whether the legislative intent in banning the ap-
plication of international law was also aimed at precluding the use of 
foreign law.227  Foreign law, as previously discussed in part A of this 
section, is not international law.228     
Finally, there is also a question of how this amendment would af-
fect the enforcement of treaties with Oklahoma’s Native American 
population.229  This is particularly pertinent in Oklahoma, which has 
the second highest Native American population in the United States 
according to the 2010 Census.230  Oklahoma legislation, along with 
other states’ anti-Sharia legislation, could prevent courts from consid-
ering the law of a tribal nation in interpreting treaties231 since this law 
lives in a separate realm to any state law.232  
The language of Oklahoma’s constitutional amendment demon-
strates a lack of understanding of the interplay between international 
and domestic law because it ignores any pre-emption by federal and 
constitutional law, and fails to consider the unintended consequences 
of enacting this type of legislation into law. 
                                                                                                                           
 224 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). 
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 226 This would include the application or interpretation of an international treaty by a court 
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 227 2010 Okla. H.J.R. 1056, codified in OKLA. CONST., art. 7 § 1(c) (language of the constitu-
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2. South Dakota House Bill 1253 
South Dakota, unlike many of the other states, enacted a blanket 
prohibition of the judicial enforcement of any religious codes.233  The 
language of the statute reads, “no court, administrative agency, or 
other governmental agency may enforce provisions of any religious 
code.”234  The text was amended from, “[n]o court, arbitrator, adminis-
trative agency, or other adjudicative mediation or enforcement au-
thority may render any judgment predicated on any religious code.”235  
The language of the amendment would suggest that the legislature 
was confining the application of the statute to courts or government 
agencies, excluding the application of this statute to private domestic 
and commercial arbitrations.236  However, the statute would still affect 
arbitration.  If a party seeks to enforce an arbitral award in a court 
that is based upon Sharia, Jewish, Cannon, or other religious law, the 
enforcing court would be prevented, according to the language of this 
statute, from enforcing that award.237  For example, the South Dakota 
legislation would prevent a judge in that state from enforcing an 
agreement to arbitrate if the parties had contractually agreed to have 
their dispute decided under a religious code or law, under similar cir-
cumstances as the facts in Mansour. 238 
F. Effects On Arbitration 
Arbitration prides itself on efficiency, flexibility, lower costs, neu-
trality, privacy, and transparency.239  Parties exercise their freedom by 
voluntarily entering into contracts with binding arbitration agree-
ments because of the advantages that arbitration offers.240  Legislation 
curtailing the enforceability of arbitration awards based on foreign, 
international, or religious code threatens to undermine the aforemen-
                                                                                                                           
 233 H.B. 1253, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012) (signed into law Mar. 12, 2012). 
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tioned advantages.241  For example, a party enforcing an arbitration 
agreement may have to defend itself against a challenge from the 
other party arguing that the foreign choice of law contravened the 
forum state’s policy.242  This would increase the time and costs of the 
dispute resolution and would likely require a collateral proceeding in 
court to make the constitutional determination before continuing the 
arbitration proceedings.243 
Both domestic and international arbitration provide a consensual 
means to resolve a dispute by a non-governmental decision maker, 
which in turn produces an enforceable and binding ruling.244  Being 
able to receive an enforceable and binding ruling is one of the most 
important aspects of arbitration.245   
In arbitration, federal and state courts have adopted a strong pol-
icy towards arbitration, staying any litigation pending arbitration.  
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, “any doubts concerning the scope 
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration whether 
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a similar defense to arbitrability.”246  Ar-
bitration clauses serve to ensure that procedurally, parties adhere to 
the requirement to resolve the dispute in arbitration rather than in a 
judicial forum.247   
If legislation banning the application of foreign, Sharia, or inter-
national law is enacted, the effect would be to severely constrain the 
effectiveness of arbitration by increasing the unpredictability and en-
forceability of arbitration awards based on foreign law.248  Some stat-
utes attempt to restrict the ability of arbitrators to consider foreign 
law in the arbitration of the issues,249 undermining the neutrality of a 
non-government decision maker charged with deciding the issue in 
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arbitration.250  Under the Arizona bill, an arbitrator would be forced to 
first consider the constitutionality of the foreign law before proceed-
ing in the application thereof.251   
Choice-of-law clauses are extremely important in international 
commercial arbitration settings.252  These clauses allow parties from 
different countries to contract with flexibility, transparency, and pre-
dictability.253  They also allow parties to select a neutral and established 
system of law, preventing one or the other party from being subjected 
to a law that may favor one party over the other based on national-
ity.254  In a survey conducted in 2010, fifty-eight% of those surveyed 
found that their choice of law was mostly guided by their familiarity 
and experience with the law chosen.255  Although this survey was con-
ducted with parties involved in international transactions, this finding 
might help explain why, in domestic settings, parties from the same 
religious faith may choose to be governed by religious law rather than 
secular rules, especially in cases where the parties are from different 
states. 
Arbitrators have broad powers to determine the applicability of a 
choice-of-law clause.256 If no particular law is chosen by the parties, 
arbitrators have the power to determine which set of conflict of law 
rules should apply.257  There have also been increasing cases where the 
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arbitrators have evoked international standards or international laws 
to reinforce the interpretation they have given to the applicable law.258  
States with legislation such as the one proposed in Oklahoma, banning 
the application of international law, would have detrimental effects on 
the enforceability of awards issued by arbitral tribunals relying on 
international standards or laws. 
G. Unintended Consequences 
1. Implications on Domestic Transactions 
Blanket prohibitions on foreign or international law have the 
power to significantly interfere with a party’s right to choose arbitra-
tion as a means to resolve commercial or domestic relations matters.259  
In the domestic arena, many individuals carry out their private domes-
tic affairs under the direction of their respective religious faiths.260 Take 
for example, United States’ citizens who are married abroad or are 
divorced in another country, under some of these proposed laws, the 
court would be barred from recognizing their marriage because it 
would be an application or enforcement of a foreign or religious law.261  
Another issue is the recognition of an individual’s will which may re-
quire distribution of property in accordance with his religious faith.  A 
court, under this type of legislation, would be prevented from probat-
ing such a will under some of the proposed statutes.262  This would 
override the principle of comity as previously discussed above.263 
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2012] The Impact of Anti-Sharia Legislation on Arbitration 213 
2. Implications on International Business Transactions 
In the last decade, business transactions have become increas-
ingly globalized, increasing the number of American businesses engag-
ing in international transactions.264  It would be impossible for this ex-
pansion to occur if trade and commerce were to be effectuated only 
on terms governed by federal and state laws.265  International arbitra-
tion has been strongly preferred by corporate entities over litigation. 266  
In fact, “hardly any international contract of commercial, financial 
importance today is concluded without resort to an arbitration 
clause.”267   
The United States remains an attractive seat for international ar-
bitration for those seeking to settle their disputes via arbitration.  The 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) has been reported as the 
institution most frequently used for international arbitration.268  The 
main benefit of arbitration on the international level is the “desire to 
avoid the risk of litigating in the adversary’s national courts and to 
profit from the neutrality of an international arbitration forum.”269  
However, proposed and enacted legislation banning the use or consid-
eration of foreign law would strip arbitration awards granted and en-
forced in the United States from possessing this neutrality. 
International commerce and trade relies on the ability of parties 
to freely negotiate and enter into agreements with parties from other 
nation states, and in allowing this, states benefit from the inherent 
benefits of free commerce.270  The application of foreign law is con-
ducted for reasons of self-interest, where states want to ensure good 
commercial and diplomatic relationships with other states.271 
Two recent cases reinforce the United States’ position as a lead-
ing forum for international arbitration proceedings.272  However, pro-
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posed anti-Sharia type legislation, in addition to pending federal legis-
lation,273 threatens to diminish the United States as an attractive forum 
for arbitration. 
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp,274 the Supreme 
Court reinforced the consensual nature of arbitration and reversed 
the AAA arbitration award because the parties had not anticipated or 
contemplated class arbitration in their arbitration agreement.275  An-
other important case reinforcing the friendly attitude the United 
States has towards arbitration is Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.276  
In Rent-A-Center, the Court underscored the severability of arbitra-
tion clauses, leaving the question of the validity of the contract con-
taining the arbitration clauses to the arbitration panel.277 
Legislation in states banning the application or consideration of 
foreign law threatens to make the United States a hostile place for 
arbitration.278  Although many of the bills limit the applicability of 
their laws to natural persons279 but exclude application to corporations, 
partnerships, or other business associations, there are still implications 
to business transactions.280  For example, various states do not treat 
partnerships as separate juridical entities; rather, they are seen as a 
group of individuals tied under a partnership agreement.281 Thus, the 
issue becomes a definitional one. When is an entity considered a busi-
ness association?  What occurs when the dispute is between a group of 
individuals and a corporation?  The same concern would arise when a 
sole proprietor in the United States enters into a contract with a for-
eign company whose arbitration agreement applies international or 
the foreign state’s law.  If that sole proprietor gets a favorable arbitra-
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tion award based on foreign law, that individual may face a constitu-
tional challenge from the other non-U.S. party arguing that the foreign 
law goes against the forum state’s public policy.   
Additionally, parties to an arbitration agreement with a foreign 
choice-of-law clause will be disadvantaged if their respective home 
state adopts restrictive legislation.  For example, they will be required 
to spend more money and perhaps even hire foreign law experts to 
certify that the foreign law applied in the arbitration did not contra-
vene the United States Constitution or any of that particular state’s 
laws or public policy. Otherwise, they might find themselves with an 
award that they may not be able to enforce.  This will be particularly 
disadvantageous to the winning party if the losing party has the most 
assets in a state that has adopted this type of restrictive legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
As echoed by many legal scholars, politicians, and organizations, 
including the American Bar Association, blanket prohibitions on the 
consideration of foreign or international law go against our own fun-
damental judicial principles.282  This type of legislation is not a solution 
but rather exacerbates the problem.  In effect, legislation of this type 
will infringe on party autonomy and will create many of the unin-
tended consequences discussed above.   
The irony of this type of legislation is that it seeks to protect 
United States citizens and their constitutional rights, but it in fact in-
fringes upon them.  In cases of similar legislation, as that enacted in 
Oklahoma or the proposed legislation in Mississippi, the statutes fa-
cially discriminate against those individuals practicing Sharia, thus 
infringing on the protections afforded by the First Amendment (Free 
Exercise Clause).   
In some cases, this type of legislation will create a hostile envi-
ronment for United States citizens attempting to enforce a judgment 
in a foreign state283 and will create a larger backlog in the nation’s 
courts as parties avoid arbitration and other alternative dispute 
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mechanisms out of the fear that their decisions will not be enforced by 
a court in the United States.  
A few things are apparent from the push to pass this type of legis-
lation: (1) there exists a mistrust of the nation’s courts, (2) proposed 
legislation is a result of political maneuver with no credible or legiti-
mate basis, and (3) “anti-Sharia” legislation serves only to create fur-
ther ethnic tension between U.S. Muslims and non-Muslims.284   
The bottom line is that these laws are redundant and unnecessary.  
The Constitution and the laws in place already provide protection 
from the enforcement of any law or contract that would run afoul to 
the U.S. Constitution or laws.  State legislatures across the country 
have begun to recognize this reality as most of the bills have died in 
committees or have failed adoption in past legislative sessions.285 
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